Abstract: in this paper, we examine the relative importance of external shocks in domestic fluctuations of East Asian countries and check if these shocks lead to asymmetric or symmetric reactions between the considered economies. To this end, we estimate, over the period 1990.1-2010.4,a structural VAR model with block exogeneity (SVARX model) relying on a comprehensive set of external shocks.We firstly document a risingimpact of these external shocks on domestic variables since the mid 1990s. Finally, real oil priceand U.S. GDP shocks have a significant impact on domestic activity and lead to more symmetric responses, compared to U.S. monetary shock and MSCI Index financial shocks.
Introduction
The Asian crisis in 1997-98 has highlighted the role of regional contagion in financial crisis.
The vulnerability of East Asian countries to these regionalcontagion effectshas been explained by their high openness degree (Corsetti et al., 1999) , as well as by their interdependence (Kaminsky et al., 2003) . This crisis has prompted these countries to strengthen their monetary cooperation on the regional scale in order to improve their monetary stability. Thus, in the aftermath of this crisis, a first wave of initiatives to implement cooperative devices between East Asian countries occurred.
1 After an initial belief in the between 1971Q1 and 1997Q2, Chow and Kim (2003 identify, in addition to country-specific shocks, global and regional ones in order to check to what extent each shock most significantly affects output fluctuations.
The emphasis placed on external shocks is understandable given some structural characteristics of East Asian countries, particularly their tradeand financial openness and questions their rising effort in coordination and policy harmonization on a regional scale.
Therefore recent literature has put the emphasis on external shocks in the region. Indeed investigating the responses to these shocks can give an additional indication, to the unique analysis of domestic shocks, on the homogeneity degree between the area's countries and on the convergence process of their policies. 2 See for instance Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) , Guillaumin (2009 ), Lombardi (2010 and Oh (2010) for the details of these agreements. 3 Global shock is approximated by the United States while Japan is used as a proxy for the regional shock.
Their main finding is that a monetary union would not be desirable in the East Asian area because economies are prone to country-specific -that is asymmetric -shocks. Some papers implement dynamic unobserved factor models. Results are mixed. Moneta and Rüffer (2009) countries to international financial crises using a structural Bayesian vector autoregression.
She compares two major crises episodes: the Asian crisis (1997M1-1999M12) and the subprime crisis (2007M1-2009M12). Her results show that the financial vulnerability of East
Asian economies has decreased but responses to international financial shocks are asymmetric.
One important shortcoming of these studies is that no one so far has engaged in a systematic examination of a comprehensive set of distinct external shocks. East Asian economies are indeed linked through a number of channels; and the extent to which economies respond to external shocks may vary depending on the nature of the foreign shock.
To overcome this drawback, we define, in this paper, several external shocks in order to quantify their respective impact on East Asian countries. More precisely we address two main issues: firstly the extent to which the vulnaribility of East Asian countries can be attributed to external factors, and secondly which of these factors leads to asymmetric or symmetric reactions between the considered economies. 
Methodological Framework

SVAR model with block exogeneity
In order to allow more accurately for the effects of external shocks on East Asian countries, we consider the following structural VAR model with block exogeneity(SVARX model): (MSCI).
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The first external shock focuses on supply shocks proxied by the real oil price. Indeed, most of these economies import raw materials for their industries (Cushman and Zha, 1997).
Astheir growth heavily still depends on exports to industrialised countries, especially with the United States, trade shock is approximed by U.S. GDP shock.The thirdexternal shock takes into account the transmission of foreign monetary policy which depends on the openness of the capital account and the exchange rate regime. As East Asian economies have adopted an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar or to a currency basket in which the weight of the dollar represents between 80 and 95% (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Ilzetzki et al., 2009 ), we may expect that domestic variables should be sensitive to changes in U.S. interest rates.
Finally, in these economies, there has been a trend towards open capital accounts. In particular, these economies benefited and keep benefiting from capital inflows which turned out to be highly volatile as evidenced by the Asian crisis and more recently by the global crisis. This is why we also retain an external financial shock able to capture stress on financial markets and proxied bythe MSCI index. 
Identification scheme
The identification of the structural form requires imposing ( ) 2 / 1 − n n restrictions, i.e. twentyone here as we considerseven variables.The model implies restrictions of short and long runs 7 We chose producer prices instead of consumption prices in order to avoid the difficulties linked to the presence of prices controls in many studied countries. Indeed, except Japan and Hong Kong, many countries in the region subsidize directly or indirectly oil prices (the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand), use prices regulation (China) or the two instruments (Indonesia and Malaysia). As a result, it is difficult to interpret consumption prices responses to oil prices shocks. 8 We have run Granger non-causality tests in order to check this hypothesis. Regarding the external block, we assume that real oil prices are not contemporaneously affected by the three others external shocks. We obtain three additional constraints.
Identification of the U.S. monetary policy follows the work of Leeper at al. (1996) in which the Fed Funds rate can respond contemporaneously to changes in the real oil price.
Furthermore, the Fed Funds rate can also respond to changes in the real U.S. GDP (Christiano et al., 1999) . The link between real and financial sectors is complex as stressedin Bernanke 
Data
Following this literature, we assume that (i)the real U.S.GDP is not affected by the U.S. interest rate and the stock market volatility and (ii) the U.S. interest rate is not affected by short term stock market volatility.
Thus, we get three additional constraints.Regarding the domestic block, we impose three long-run zero restrictions, as in Blanchard and Quah (1989) , Clarida and Gali (1994) and Sims and Zha (1999) , where: (i) a domestic demand shock has no impact on the domestic product and (ii) a monetary domestic shock has no impact on the domestic product and on the nominal exchange rate.We use SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations) estimation with the above block exogeneity assumption to identify structural shocks by imposing both contemporaneous and long-run restrictions.In order to take into account financial crises that have hit East Asian economies (Asian crisis, recent world crisis), we introduce two dummy variables: the firstone equals to 1 from 1997Q2 to 1998Q3 and 0 otherwise; the second one in order to include the main economic episodes which have characterized the integration process of East Asian countries (1997-1998 crisis, 2007-2008 For all studied countries, except Indonesia, over a short-run horizon (1-4 periods), the all period sample shows that external shocks explain at least 11 percent of the real GDP variances. Japan and Hong Kong are especially sensitive to these shocks insofar as the latter explain respectively 58.8 and 36.8 of their real GDP variance. External shocks tend to be persistent as their weight in the real GDP variances increases with time horizon. The subsample period -from 1996Q1 to 2010Q4 -exhibits a clear increase in the influence of external shocks. More precisely, at the short-run horizon, these shocks explain more than 15
11 Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam were removed from the sample because of the lack of data availability. 12 Census X-12 method. 13 In this respect, we have run usual ADF and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. We also have tested for structural breaks by using firstly Perron (1989) test with exogenous break dates. In that case, we chose 1997.2 as a break date: it is indeed after the second quarter of 1997 that the crisis develops in earnest (Rüffer et al., 2007) . We also have used the methodology developed by Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Clemente et al. (1998) 14 External shocks exert a stronger influence on producer price index (PPI) than on GDP.
Indeed, producer prices are more prone to international influences than consumption prices.
From this perspective, the high impact of external shocks on PPI partly mirrors the rising trend in the trade openness in many East Asian countries. Table B .2 suggests that the more a country is opened, the more external shocks exert an influence on domestic prices (see, for
instance, Singapore and Hong Kong). In countries with lower trade openness, the increasing influence on external variables on PPI variance rests on trade specialization in manufactures exports (as in China, Japan, and South Korea).As for the GDP, external shocks exert a persistent influence on domestic prices. The sub-period sample does not significantly change the results. Consistent with the increase in the trade openness after the Asian crisis, the shortrun influence on external shocks increases in all countries except Indonesia.
Over this sub-period sample, only Hong Kong exhibits a declining share of external shocks in the GDP variance. Such trend -that contrasts with the rise in its trade openness over the same period -may be due to the stabilizing influence of China after 1997.
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The influence of external shocks on the nominal exchange rates (NER thereafter) offers a very different picture in the two samples for the short-horizon (1-4 periods). Indeed, while in the all period sample external shocks account for less than 10 percent of the NER variances in six countries, the number falls to two countries for the sub-period sample. In other words, the influence of external shocks has risen over the period 1996Q1-2010Q4. At the long-run horizon, the two samples suggest a dramatic increase in the impact of external shocks. In the all period, we note that external shocks explain more than 25 percent of the variance in all countries. This persistence of external shocks is confirmed in the sub-period sample except for Singapore. The increase in oil dependence of the region seems to explain this evolution.
Indeed, the relative importance of each external shocksuggests that East Asian countries are more sensitive to real shocks than to monetary and financial shocks. Interestingly, the subperiod sample (TablesB.4 to B.6) does not qualitatively change this result.More precisely, Table B .4 shows that domestic GDP tend to be more influenced by real oil prices shocks and 14 The area is characterised by a decrease of trade dependence on the US benefiting Southeast Asia and, though less so, the Asean. This intra-area trade shift is confirmed by (i) a strong dependence on Japan, China and, to a lesser extent, Korea and Singapore, and by ( Asian economies to monitor exchange rates within the region and attempts to keep the relative value of their currencies in line with the value of selected regional currencies. These "competitive" adjustments in exchange rates are allegedly made so as to maintain the competitiveness of their exports on globalmarkets.
International monetary shocks (Fed funds disturbances) and international financial shocks (MSCI disturbances) exert the weakest influence on domestic variables in most of our studied countries. This result holds whatever the sample period and is in accordance with recent litterature on this issue (Maćkowiak, 2007; Moneta and Rüffer, 2009; Gimet, 2011 In all countries except for the Philippines (in the all-period sample), domestic currencies have appreciated in the aftermath of the oil shocks. Such result is not surprising for the main oil exporting economies in the region (Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia). For other countries, the appreciation may rest on the positive relationship between oil prices increases and world
The sub-period sample confirms the previous findings.
However, for many countries, we note both stronger responses on impact of the oil shocks and fluctuations of GDP.
As expected, in all countries and for the two samples, domestic production prices increase after the real oil prices shocks. It is important to stress that responses of PPI are similar across our studied countries both in terms of contemporaneous reactions and persistence.
13 growth. Indeed, East Asian countries can reap the benefits of a higher regional GDP in terms of higher export revenues which in turn exert an upward pressure on the NER. Notes: ''1-4'' stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ''16-20'' stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters after a shock. Notes: ''1-4'' stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ''1-8'' stands for the average between the first quarter after a shock and 8 quarters after a shock. ''8-16'' stands for the average between 8 quarters after a shock and 16 quarters after a shock. ''16-20'' stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters after a shock. Notes: ''1-4'' stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ''16-20'' stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters after a shock. Notes: ''1-4'' stands for the average between 1 quarter after a shock and 4 quarters after a shock. ''16-20'' stands for the average between 16 quarters after a shock and 20 quarters after a shock. 1 Note: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).The correlation coefficients were calculated over 20 quarters. 1 Note: significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*).The correlation coefficients were calculated over 20 quarters. 
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